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P.: Res Judicata--Collateral Attack on Decree for Sale of Land for Sc
CASE COMMENTS
front wheels to curb or side of the highway." W. VA. CODE c.

17C, art. 14, § 1 (Michie 1955).
Thus far this statute has provoked no litigation reaching the supreme court.
It is settled law in this state that the violation of a statute is
prima facie negligence, but only if the violation is the proximate
cause of the injury. See e.g., State Road Comm'n v. Ball, 188 W.
Va. 849, 76 S.E.2d 55 (1958); Somerville v. Dellosa, 183 W. Va.
485, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949); Oldfield v. Woodall, 118 W. Va. 85,
166 S.E. 691 (1932); Tarr v. Lumber Co., 106 W. Va. 99, 144 S.E.
881 (1928). The proximate cause of an injury is the last negligent
act contributing thereto and without which the injury would not
have resulted. Webb v. Sessler, 185 W. Va. 841, 68 S.E.2d 65
(1950); Anderson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 74 W. Va. 17, 81 S.E.
579 (1914). Where there is a sole, effective intervening cause,
there can be no other proximate cause of the injury. Webb v. Sessler,
supra.
The most pertinent of all West Virginia cases holds that while
the negligent act of one person may naturally cause injury to
another, yet if before the injury results, the negligent act of a third
party intervenes and produces the injury, the latter alone is responsible, although but for the first negligent act the injury could not
have occurred. Anderson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra. Following
such a holding, the court could not hold the car owner liable in a
case such as the principal case even though he violated a statute.
In view of the foregoing, there seems to be no reason to believe
that the West Virginia court would not follow the majority rule,
absolving the owner of liability when a thief negligently injures a
third person; the act of the thief constituting the intervening and
proximate cause of the injury.
J. S. T.
RES JuDICATA-CoLLATERAL ATTAcK ON DECREE FOR SALE OF
LAmN

FOR

SCHOOL FuND.-Plaintiff brought suit to cancel two deeds

made by the deputy commissioner of forfeited and delinquent
lands conveying certain lands to the defendant. The deeds were
made pursuant to orders of the circuit court in a chancery suit
brought by the deputy commissioner directing and confirming the
sale of the land for the benefit of the school fund. Plaintiff alleged
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that the taxes had been paid and that there was no real delinquency
so that the state had acquired no title which could be sold. The
defendant interposed a demurrer on the ground, inter alia, that
the former suit, in which plaintiff was a party defendant, was res
judicata as to plaintiff's alleged cause of action. The trial judge
overruled the demurrer and certified the question to the supreme
court. Held, that the suit formerly pending in the circuit court
must be considered as regularly brought and determined and,
with no appeal therefrom, that it adjudicated with finality the
issues of delinquency, the sale to the state, and the sale to the
defendant. Robinson Improvement Co. v. Tassa Coal Co., 101
S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1957).
The importance of the decision lies in its determination that
the former owner of land which has been sold to the state for
delinquent taxes and subsequently sold by the deputy commissioner
pursuant to orders of the circuit court in a proceeding instituted
under W. VA. CODE c. 11A, art. 4 (Michie 1955), cannot attack the
validity of the transfer in a collateral proceeding. The decision
would seem to dispel some of the doubt which has too long existed
with regard to the reliability of land titles so transferred. Before
passing upon the soundness of the holding, there are serious questions which should be considered.
It is well settled law that an adjudication by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, no matter how
erroneous, is final and conclusive, not only as to matters actually
determined in the action, but as to every matter which might have
been properly adjudicated therein. Adkins v. Adkins, 97 S.E.2d
789 (W. Va. 1957); Walker v. West Virginia Gas Corp., 121 W. Va.
251, 3 S.E.2d 55 (1939); Zirkle v. Moore, Keppel & Co., 110 W. Va.
531, 158 S.E. 785 (1931); Sayre's Adm'r v. Harpold, 33 W. Va. 553,
11 S.E. 16 (1890). To be res judicata it is not essential that the
matter should have been formally put in issue in the former suit.
Sayre's Adnr v. Harpold, supra. Nor is it necessary that precisely
the same parties be before the court in the different suits, if the
subject-matter of the controversy is the same. Corrothers v. Sargent, 20 W. Va. 351 (1882).
Where the judgment or decree is rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction, there is a presumption in favor of its jurisdiction. Unless
the record discloses a want of jurisdiction the presumption is conclusive, and the judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. Lemley v.
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Wetzel Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 151, 95 S.E. 646 (1918). See
Adkins v. Adkins, supra, for cases in support of this rule. Contra,
Dixon v. Hesper Coal & Coke Co., 100 W. Va. 422, 130 S.E. 663
(1925); Fulton v. Ramsey, 67 W. Va. 321, 68 S.E. 381 (1910). If
the court is without jurisdiction, its judgment and all proceedings
under it,or dependent on it are void. Adkins v. Adkins, supra;
Cruikshank v. Duffield, 138 W. Va. 726, 77 S.E.2d 600 (1953).
Where the court is one of limited jurisdiction, the rule is different and the record must show affirmatively every fact necessary
to give the court jurisdiction before any presumption arises as to
the validity of the proceedings. Nelson Transfer & Storage Co. v.
Jarrett, 110 W. Va. 97, 157 S.E. 46 (1931); Mayer v. Adams, 27
W. Va. 244 (1885). Several cases state the rule that although the
court is one of general jurisdiction, if, in the particular proceeding,
it is not acting according to the course of the common law, but
under some special statute giving a summary remedy, it stands
on the same footing with a court of limited jurisdiction and its
jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown. And unless its proceedings are in conformity to the statute, they must be considered as
void and open to attack whenever any right is asserted thereunder. Cruikshank v. Duffield, supra; County Court v. Brammer,
68 W. Va. 25, 69 S.E. 450 (1910).
It is submitted that a circuit court entertaining a proceeding
under W. VA. CODE c. 11A, art. 4 (Michie 1955), is not acting
pursuant to its general jurisdiction, but pursuant to a special jurisdiction conferred by the statute and, if the above statement is a
valid rule of law, failure to proceed according to the statute would
deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter a valid decree. Query
as to the effect of the statement in W. VA. CODE c. 11A, art. 4, § 33
(Michie 1955), that "... no irregularity, error or mistake in respect
to any step in the procedure leading up to and including confirmation of the sale or delivery of the deed shall invalidate the title
thereby acquired." This provision may cure any irregularity which
is not jurisdictional but it cannot supply a lack of jurisdiction.
In the principal case, plaintiff sought to show, by the allegation that the taxes had been paid, that there was no title in the
state and that the court was therefore without jurisdiction to order
the sale. In Sims v. Fisher,125 W. Va. 512, 536, 25 S.E.2d 216, 227
(1943), the court, in striking down certain provisions of a prior
statute, held that W. VA. CoNsT. art. XIII, § § 4 and 5 require that
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before a sale of land may be ordered, there must be a judicial finding that the title to the land sought to be sold is, in fact, in the
state, and is therefore subject to sale. This, said the court, is "the
first necessary step in any proceeding to sell lands for the benefit
of the school fund." The following statement appears in syllabus 8
of State v. Gray, 182 W. Va. 472, 52 S.E.2d 759 (1949): "Under
section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution of this state, the proceeding therein required to be instituted in the circuit courts, for
the sale of land for the benefit of the school fund, must be a
judicial proceeding, and may be instituted only after the title to the
land proceeded against has become vested in the state."
The import of these decisions is that title in the state is a
jurisdictional fact, and a judicial finding that the fact exists is a
prerequisite to acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. It is submitted that without such finding, a decree of sale rendered by the
court would be not merely erroneous and voidable, but void. And
the record being silent, the want of jurisdiction could be shown by
extraneous evidence in a collateral proceeding.
There is language in the principal opinion intimating that the
presumption of jurisdiction may be rebutted by evidence de hors
the record. This was strongly argued by the dissenting judge in
Adkins v. Adkins, supra. The general rule, supported by a decided
majority of cases in this state, is to the contrary. See cases cited in
Adkins v. Adkins, supra. However, the rule of those cases has
application to proceedings wherein the court is not acting pursuant
to a special statute, but pursuant to its general jurisdiction. Perhaps
the rule limiting attacks on the court's jurisdiction to matters on
the record is the better one since it is more in accord with the
policy favoring the security of land titles. Nowhere in the law is
there greater need for stability than in cases involving land titles.
That stability cannot be achieved unless proceedings for the sale of
land to enforce the state's lien for taxes is accorded the same degree
of finality accorded to other judicial proceedings.
Although the tenor of the opinion in the principal case is to
consider the former proceeding as conclusive of all issues which
could have been determined therein, the holding is specifically
limited to the issues of delinquency, the sale to the state and the
sale to the defendant. These are the jurisdictional issues referred to
in the Fisher and Gray cases, supra. Thus, an interesting question
is presented. Where all interested parties were properly before the
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court in the former suit, would the holding of the principal case,
making these issues res judicata in a collateral proceeding, plus the
language of W. VA. CODE c. llA, art. 4, § 38, to the effect that
procedural irregularities shall not invalidate the title transferred,
operate to give the purchaser a good title? While a definite answer
must depend upon the course of future decisions, the principal case
is such as to encourage greater reliance on the validity of land titles
transferred under W. VA. CODE c. 11A, art. 4 (Michie 1955).
L. L. P.

TORTs-LAnOwNEi's LxAnruxr

TO

Cmn

TrEsPAssERs.-Action

on the case was brought by P, a ten year old lad, who was injured
following an explosion of a mixture contained in a can or filter found
by the boy on or near a playground located on D coal company's
leasehold. D and other coal companies customarily dumped rubbish
and refuse on or near the playground area. Judgment for P. On
appeal, held, reversed and new trial ordered. Although D, in the
absence of the exercise of ordinary care, would be liable for injuries
sustained by a foreseeable child trespasser who is injured by a dangerous instrumentality D maintains on his land, P here failed to
prove by substantial evidence that D had dumped the can or filter
on or near the playground. Justice v. Amherst Coal Co., 101 S.E.2d
860 (W. Va. 1958).
At early common law no duty of care, other than to refrain
from inflicting willful and wanton injury, was owed the trespasser,
whether he be a child or adult. PRossER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
As society became more highly industrialized and urbanized it
became apparent that the harsh effects resulting from the strict
common law rule invited modification of the rule itself, particularly in
respect to child trespassers, since the value of the child to the community was quite as important as the private right of the landowner
to the unfettered use of his land. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 68 YALE L.J. 144, 161
(1958).
An affirmative duty of care was first imposed upon the landowner in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657
(1873). Here the child trespasser, coming upon the land to play,
was injured by D's unlocked unguarded turntable. The Stout case,
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